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The Attorney-Client Privilege: A Look at Its Effect
on the Corporate Client and the Corporate Executive
Executive X may be making statements to his employer's corpo-
rate counsel which he believes fall within the scope of the corpora-
tion's attorney-client privilege and cannot be disclosed, but may in
fact legally be divulged by the corporation's attorney.' In this scena-
rio, unless the executive informs his employer's counsel that he is
seeking advice for himself, even if the information falls within the
scope of the corporation's privilege the executive is not protected
because the privilege belongs to the corporation.2
The attorney-client privilege is a narrow exception to the general
duty to disclose.3 It is based on the rationale that the best way to
induce the client to divulge all the information necessary to reach a
reasoned legal decision is to protect such communication with a
privilege.4 The attorney-client privilege encourages communication
in the noncorporate setting because it protects the client who typi-
cally is also the spokesperson.5 The attorney-client privilege thus
I See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd per curiam,
570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1977).
2 A corporate client, as well as an individual client, is entitled to waive the privilege. Note,
The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L.
Rav. 360, 366-69 (1970); See Heininger, The Attorney-Client Privilege As It Relates To The
Corporation, 53 ILL. B.J. 376, 386 (1965). See generally Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege:
Its Application to Corporations, The Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw.
U.L. REv. 235-43 (1961).
3 It is a fundamental principle that the public is entitled to every person's evidence, and
exemptions from the general duty to disclose are exceptional. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430
F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EvMEcE § 2192, at 70 (rev. ed. J.
McNaughton 1961)).
"If the privilege is to achieve its purpose of encouraging communications, the communi-
cants must be able to discern at the stage of primary activity, whether the communications
will be privileged." Note, Attorney-Client Privilege For Corporate Clients: The Control Group
Test, 84 HARv. L. REv. 424, 426 (1970).
"By providing an exception preventing confidential communications from being elicited
from an attorney by judicial coercion, the privilege induces the client to communicate infor-
mation which would otherwise remain undisclosed." Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and
the Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50 So. CAL. L. REv. 303, 305-06 (1977).
3 The classic formula is that
[t]he privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the pres-
ence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceedings; and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or torts; and (4) the privilege has been
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supplements the right to counsel.' The traditional rationale breaks
down, however, when it is applied in the corporate setting. The
corporate executive is only the spokesperson; the corporation is the
client and it alone may invoke or waive the privilege.7
Although there have been few reported cases in which a corpora-
tion has waived its attorney-client privilege and left an executive to
seek protection for himself,8 even these few cases pose the danger
that as executives realize that they may not be protected by the
corporation, the corporate attorney-client privilege will not serve to
encourage the executive to provide corporate counsel with the infor-
mation necessary to make legal decisions for the corporation.9 This
is particularly important in the corporate setting where such com-
municatiofi is necessary to plan the corporation's daily actions so as
to be within the law.' 0 The danger for the executive is that the
corporation is free to legally disclose information he has communi-
cated to corporate counsel with the belief that it would not be dis-
closed."
While the conventional privilege could be extended to encompass
the executive and grant him the status and protection of a client
within the scope of the attorney-client privilege, such an extension
is impractical because of the joint-clients exception to the privilege
and the conflicts of interest created when an attorney represents two
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
"The attorney-client privilege is basic to a relation of trust and confidence that, though
not given express constitutional security, is yet essentially interrelated with the specific
constitutional guaranties of the individual's right to counsel. . . ." State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J.
400, 415, 129 A.2d 417, 425 (1957) (citing 8 J. WIOMORE, EvmaNCE § 2191, at 70 (rev. ed. J.
McNaughton 1961)).
" See generally Note, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235 (1961), supra note 2; see also Simon, The
Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied To Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956).
E.g., United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 932
(1972); United States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd per curiam, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1977).
1 For example, one observer of the privilege in the corporate arena has noted that "the
policy of the privilege gives its full application to corporate communications, since the group
of agents and directors who motivate a corporation need the incentive of the privilege fully
as much as do private clients to encourage full disclosure to counsel." Note, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.
235 (1961), supra note 2, at 241.
,1 Because of the complex regulation of business that currently prevails in our society,
corporations must seek counsel daily to stay within the bounds of the law. Miller, The
Challenges To The Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REv. 262, 268-70 (1963). "If there
exists any single place where society needs the buffer of legal advice to separate the whims
of a client from immediate gratification, that place is the boardroom of the modern corpora-
tion." Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in
the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339, 340 (1972).
" See note 2 supra.
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clients with competing interests. 12 Moreover, recent cases indicate
that the courts are reluctant to extend the privilege in this manner. 3
Given the judicial reluctance to extend the conventional privilege
to include the corporate executive, there is a need for a separately
formulated executive privilege." Such an executive privilege would
encourage attorney-client communication in the corporate arena by
granting the executive spokesperson protection similar to that be-
stowed upon the client (spokesperson) in the noncorporate arena.
By encouraging the executive to communicate with corporate coun-
sel, the executive privilege thus would not only provide the execu-
tive with protection but also supplement the corporation's right to
legal counsel. 5
This note will explore the reason for the corporate executive's
misplaced reliance on the attorney-client privilege and the corpo-
rate executive's dilemma in deciding whether to divulge information
to the corporation's attorney. The note will then propose a new
corporate executive privilege analogous to the governmental execu-
tive privilege set forth in the Freedom of Information Act.
THE EXECUTIVE'S MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE PRIVILEGE
The scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege is currently
defined by two conflicting lines of authority." One view describes
12 See text accompanying notes 38-44 infra.
1 E.g., United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700 (8th Cirn 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 932
(1972); United States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 434 F. Supp 648 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd per curiam, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1977).
1, As corporate executives begin to realize that they cannot predict whether the corporation
will hold their communications to be privileged, they may provide less information to the
corporation's attorney. One critic of the privilege in the corporate arena has noted that
without the predictive certainty needed to induce disclosure by the client, the
privilege is effectively vitiated; none of the benefits flowing from disclosure will
be realized, and counsel will be made less effective. This lack of certainty may
not only fail to induce communications, but may even have a chilling effect
upon communications between a client and his attorney.
Note, 50 So. CAL. L. REV. 303 (1977), supra note 4, at 322.
" One observer has noted that
the nature of an attorney as an arm of law enforcement lends support to the
legitimacy of the corporate need for legal counsel. The probability of bringing
corporations into compliance with the law is enhanced by the greater access of
corporations to counsel resulting from the availability of the privilege. There-
fore, corporations need effective legal counsel, perhaps even more than do indi-
vidual clients, to advise them in their varied and complex array of activities.
Id. at 309 (footnotes omitted).
1, Some courts, for example, have held that communications are privileged only
when made to a lawyer from a corporate employee who is in a position to control
or take substantial part in a deicision about action that the corporation
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the privilege in terms of the "control group test." Under this test,
in order to determine whether a particular communication is privi-
leged it is necessary to determine if the employee who communi-
cates the information is in a position of control and plays such a
substantial role in the corporate decisionmaking process that when
he makes a decision he personifies the corporation. 7 This has been
praised as a "bright-line test" because it applies to a very small,
identifiable group within the corporation;"8 on reflection, however,
less desirable effects become evident. One such effect of its "bright-
line" nature is that those executives who properly conclude that
they are within the control group often assume that the corporation
will protect communications they make to corporate counsel regard-
ing corporate matters, because the communications fall within the
corporation's attorney-client privilege.'9 Should the interests of the
corporation and the executive subsequently be severed, however,
the executive may discover that the corporation has waived its
attorney-client privilege with respect to communications which the
executive assumed would be protected. 0
A newer line of authority defines a privilege which is broader than
that delimited by the "control group test."2' Under this view, an
employee under a duty to make a corporate communication, al-
though not a member of the control group, may nonetheless make
a privileged communication if the communication is made at the
direction of an executive within the control group, under circum-
stances where the members of the control group seek advice from
the corporation's attorney about the subject matter of the communi-
cation. 22 Because even lower level employee communications may
may take on the attorney's advice. Other courts finding the 'control group' test
too restrictive, extend the privilege to communications by an employee made
at the direction of his superiors when the subject matter of the communication
concerns the employee's performance of duties within the scope of his employ-
ment and the privilege has been found to operate without regard to the status
of the employee.
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Fay, 451 F.2d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted); Note, 84 HAv.
L. REv. 424 (1970), supra note 4, at 429-35; see Note, 69 MmIH. L. REv. 360 (1970), supra note
2, at 369-74.
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
, See Note, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424 (1970), supra note 4, at 430.
"ITlhe privilege may fulfill its function more effectively when corporate officers are
involved, since these officers are more likely than the average private litigant to know of its
existence." Note, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235 (1961), supra note 2, at 241.
20 The corporation is the client and it alone controls the application of its privilege. See
note 6 supra. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich.), affd
per curiam, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1977).
21 Note, 69 MICH. L. Rav. 360 (1970), supra note 2, at 360-66.
22 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem.
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fall within the scope of the expanded privilege this line of authority
endorses,23 an even greater number of corporate employees may be
induced to rely upon a privilege which is not their own.24
THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE'S DILEMMA
The corporate executive often finds himself under a duty to sup-
ply information on behalf of his employer to the corporation's attor-
ney. If he discloses the information he is required to divulge, he may
subsequently find that the corporation has waived its attorney-
client privilege and its attorney has divulged information the execu-
tive believed was confidential.2 If the attorney is later called to
testify before a grand jury, the executive may find himself subject
to an indictment.28
On the other hand, if the executive refuses to divulge information
to the corporation's attorney he may lose his job. It is true that the
executive has the right to claim the protection of the fifth amend-
ment in the courtroom, but there is no basis for protecting the
executive who seeks to invoke the fifth amendment for protection
against his employer.? Moreover, when the officers of a corporation
by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
2 E.g., cases citing Harper & Row with approval: Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 136, 146 (D. Del. 1977) (citing Duplan Corp., infra); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken,
Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1165 (D.S.C. 1974) ("We conclude that the control group test is not
wholly adequate, that the corporation's attorney-client privilege protects communications of
some corporate agents who are not within the control group. . . ."); Sylgab Steel & Wire
Corp. v. IMOCO-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 456 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd mer., 534 F.2d
330 (7th Cir. 1976) ("It is well settled that the dissemination of a communication between a
corporation's lawyer and an employee of that corporation to those employees directly con-
cerned with such matters does not waive the attorney-client privilege."); Xerox Corp. v.
International Business Machines Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("While the
Special Master is inclined to accept the formulation of the Harper & Row case there has not
been provided sufficient data as to each of the interviewees for the Special Master to make
an informed judgment on that basis."); Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 428 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) ("We feel that the proper rule is that announced in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Decker.").
11 See note 19 supra.
15 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich.), affd per curiam, 570 F.2d
562 (6th Cir. 1977).
21 If a corporation-i.e. its attorneys, directors or officers-divulges an executive's commu-
nication to a grand jury or a prosecutor, the executive may become subject to criminal
charges, notwithstanding the executive's belief that his communication would be privileged.
See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65-66 (1905).
" While there are no reported cases in the private sector, the Supreme Court has upheld
the discharge of government employees for failure to divulge information. In Nelson v. Los
Angeles County, 362 U.S. 1 (1960), employees of the county of Los Angeles, California were
subpoenaed by a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. They re-
fused to answer certain questions concerning employment. A California statute required
0
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disclose information communicated by one of the executives, it is
difficult for the executive to protect himself. A corporation typically
is made up of a large number of stockholders, directors and employ-
ees; because of this diversity, a single executive is not likely to be
aware of all the decisions taking place throughout the corporation
and thus may not recognize that his communications may subject
him to criminal liability. Moreover, should the executive later be
indicted, this lack of information may make it impossible for him
to prove his innocence .28
EXECUTIVE-ATTORNEY COMMUNICATION: ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
CORPORATION
An executive's inability to rely on the corporation's attorney-
client privilege is detrimental to the corporation as well. The corpo-
rate client, more than any other client, plans its daily actions to be
assured that they are within the law, and depends on the informa-
tion supplied to it by its agents. 9 Without the protection of the
attorney-client privilege, although the executive may not refuse to
speak with corporate counsel, he may be inclined to provide less
information; and without this information it is doubtful whether the
corporation's attorney will be able to provide adequate counsel2 °
There are two possible solutions to this problem: the present cor-
porate attorney-client privilege could be extended to protect the
corporate executive; or, a new privilege could be developed to pro-
tect the corporate executive.
The Inadequacy of the Conventional Privilege
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would allow the
government employees to answer such questions, but the employees sought the protection of
the first and fifth amendments. The Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the discharge, rea-
soning that the state had a legitimate interest in obtaining information touching on the field
of security. Id. at 8.
[T~he fact is, the intelligence-gathering operations of any organization
have to be limited, and, at present, the areas in the corporation's environment
from which it seeks data are typically those that will inform it upon prospective
sales volume, demand shifts, competitive behavior, and the like. Of its own
accord (and, as we saw, even under the law's implied threats) the corporation
is not readily prepared to find out where, say, its pollutants are going, or to
evaluate systematically what harm they may be causing over an extended period
of time.
C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 116 (1975).
21 See note 10 supra.
so See note 14 supra.
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attorney-client privilege to be extended on a case-by-case basis .3
The cases indicate, however, that the courts are reluctant to extend
the corporate attorney-client privilege to protect the individual ex-
ecutive. In United States v. Bartlett32 it was held that the chief
executive officer of the corporation (who was also a director) who
had been accused of securities fraud, could not claim the corpora-
tion's attorney-lient privilege to prevent the testimony of the cor-
poration's attorney. Even though the attorney had represented the
director at SEC hearings after the allegedly privileged communica-
tions were made, the court maintained that the defendant failed to
establish that the necessary attorney-client relationship existed at
the time the allegedly privileged communication was made.33
In In re Grand Jury. Proceedings (Jackier),34 the Sixth Circuit held
that the corporate attorney-client privilege should not be extended
to protect the communicating officer of a corporation. The conflict
in Jackier resulted when a grand jury subpoenaed the counsel of a
corporation to testify about communications with the ex-vice-
president of the corporation. Between the time of the communica-
tion and the subpoena, the interests of the corporation and the vice-
president were severed; he was no longer affiliated with the corpora-
tion when the grand jury subpoenaed the corporation's attorney,
and the corporation waived the attorney-client privilege with re-
spect to communications the vice-president made to the attorney-.
The former vice-president then sought to invoke the privilege to
protect himself, but both the district court and the court of appeals
rejected his claim.35 The corporate client was allowed to waive the
attorney-client privilege, despite the interests of its former em-
ployee. For the executive, the decision meant that the communica-
tions he had believed to be immune from disclosure would be open
to the grand jury and could serve as the basis of an indictment
31 Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pur-
suant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
32 449 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 704.
' 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd per curiam, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1977).
: Id. at 650.
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against him. 6
The inability of the attorney-client privilege to protect individual
executives is a function of the corporation's unitary operation.
While the members of a corporate entity may have diverse interests
as individuals, they must develop an organizational interest in order
to function properly, and it is this collective interest that is repre-
sented when the corporation hires an attorney:
The concept of a representative of the client comes into the rule
and is needed to permit an accurate consideration of how a
corporation communicates with a lawyer. Surely [the commu-
nicating officer is] a representative of the client. Surely his
communications [are] privileged, but the privilege [is] that of
[the corporation] under the traditional statement of rule."7
Because the executive is only a representative of the corporate
client, if the corporate executive needs individual protection, it will
not come from the conventional attorney-client privilege. The un-
stated rationale for this limitation is two-fold: first, an extension of
the privilege to protect the corporate executive may create conflict
of interests between the attorney, the executive, and the corpora-
tion; second, the joint-clients exception to the privilege may make
it impossible -for the attorney at once to keep confidential the com-
munications received from the corporation and the executive.
The Corporate Counsel's Conflict of Interest
A conflict of interest may occur because the interests of the corpo-
ration and the executive are not always the same."' A lawyer has
ethical responsibilties which make it impossible for him to represent
two conflicting interests.3 9 Since the attorney cannot give his pri-
" In addition, the courts have refused to extend the privilege to the individual members
of an organization even when the organization remained unincorporated. In United States v.
De Lillo, 448 F.Supp. 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), the conflict arose after the interests of the board
of trustees of a union pension fund and one of its former chairmen were severed. The court
held that since the present board of trustees waived the attorney-client privilege, the board's
attorney could testify about communications made by the defendant to the board and its
attorney. 448 F. Supp. at 843.
434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
The problem occurs when a lawyer or a law firm represents a number of entities or
persons; this can arise in a number of ways. "It sometimeg occurs when both a public corpora-
tion and some of its officers or directors are under investigation. Although their interests may
be the same in some instances, they may not be in others and sharp conflicts may exist."
Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some
Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 10 (1973).
11 Canon Seven of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs the attorney to represent
his client wholeheartedly within the bounds of the law. A lawyer cannot represent one client
wholeheartedly if he simultaneously represents a second client whose interests conflict with
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mary allegiance to both, at least one of his clients will suffer. 0
Moreover, The Code of Professional Responsibility directs the attor-
ney to represent his "client." This indicates that when a lawyer
represents a corporation he owes his primary allegiance to the corpo-
rate entity, and not its agents, shareholders or any other person
associated with the corporation.4' The theory that the attorney owes
his primary loyalty to his "client" is also evident in malpractice
law.42 While the lawyer may be sued for malpractice if he negligently
harms his client, generally he may not be sued by third parties who
are also harmed in the process. 3 Both the Code of Professional
Responsibility and malpractice law thus indicate that the attorney
owes his primary duty to his client; he should not represent two
clients with conflicting interests.
The Joint-Clients Exception
The joint-clients exception to the privilege is a further reason why
it is difficult for the corporate attorney to represent both the corpo-
rate executive and the corporate entity. This is especially true when
the attorney represents the executive individually, to protect the
communications made by the executive to the attorney. Under the
those of the first. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBIIY, Ethical Considerations Canon
7.
40 While a lawyer may represent potentially divergent interests, he is professionally obli-
gated to obtain the consent of both parties. One must ask whether such consent is meaningful
when dealing with the public corporation because in mang cases there does not exist a truly
disinterested management or board of directors capable of giving consent. The better practice
would be to have the corporation separately represented, as is the case in shareholder deriva-
tive suits. Sonde, supra note 38.
" ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 5-18.
42 As a general rule, the plaintiff in a malpractice action is required to prove that he was
the attorney's client. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Brennan, 114 Ariz. 124, 559 P.2d 680 (1976);
Reamer v. Kessler, 233 Md. 311, 196 A.2d 896 (1964).
,1 However, in recent years the courts have begun to recognize liability to third persons
where the attorney negligently rendered services which he should have recognized as involving
a foreseeable injury to the third party. Most actions seeking to extend the liability imposed
upon an attorney to nonclients have involved assertions of negligence either in connection
with the preparation of a will or the examination and certification of title to property. E.g.,
Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161 (1969) (the court upheld the right of the daughters
of the deceased to sue the decedent's attorney for failing to fulfill the instructions of the
decedent and thereby injurying the plaintiffs); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685
(1961), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1962) (the court held that lack of privity between the
beneficiaries and the attorney did not preclude the beneficiaries from maintaining an action
in tort against the attorney for negligently drafting decedent's will); Licata v. Spector, 26
Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1968) (the court upheld the right of the administrator and the
beneficiaries of a will declared invalid because of its failure to meet statutory requirements
to sue the attorney-drafter of the will for negligence). See also Note, Public Accountants and
Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 588 (1972).
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joint-clients exception, communications made to the same attorney
by separate clients are not privileged if the two clients should be-
come adversaries in subsequent litigation.44 Both a corporation and
its executive represented by the same attorney could find the com-
munications made to that attorney unprotected if they should one
day find themselves on opposing sides in court.
A NEW "EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE"
While there is no statutory bar to extending the attorney-client'
privilege to the executive who is employed by a corporation repre-
sented by corporate counsel, an analysis of the potential conflicts
of interests, the dangers of legal malpractice and the joint-clients
exception to the privilege all indicate that such an extension would
not benefit either the attorney, the corporation, or the executive.
Of course, the executive may always seek legal counsel for himself,
but this is impractical.in the business world where an executive
constantly must disclose information and make snap decisions that
require the advice of the corporation's legal counsel. The actions of
both the executive and the corporation would be constrained if the
executive were required to consult his own legal counsel as well as
the corporation's legal counsel in order to protect himself in the
event of legal proceedings. Moreover, should the executive's private
attorney counsel him to refuse to divulge corporate information, the
executive has no protection against losing his job if he follows his
attorney's legal advice. It is evident, therefore, that an additional
form of protection for the executive is necessary.
A private sector privilege analogous to the executive privilege
adopted in the governmental sector under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act" could be employed to obviate these concerns. The prob-
lems encountered in the governmental sector are not unlike those
encountered outside government; in both sectors it is necessary to
promote a free flow of ideas and information in order to develop the
best plans and ideas, and to receive the most helpful kind of legal
advice. At the same time, it is important to place some controls on
" "It is a settled rule that the privilege does not apply, inter sese, when two or more persons
having shared a single attorney on a matter of common interest subsequently have a falling
out with respect to the subject matter of the consultation." Simon, supra note 7, at 986-87.
11 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The executive privilege is based on the first exception to the
Freedom of Information Act, although the courts have extended the privilege beyond the
language of the exception. See note 51 & accompanying text infra.
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the governmental entity," as well as the corporate entity,47 so that
they will not wield power in disregard of the law.
The Executive Privilege in the Governmental Sector
The executive privilege recognized in the Freedom of Information
Act," like the attorney-client privilege," is a narrow exception to a
general duty to disclose. While the drafters of the Act recognized
that the public cannot make intelligent, informed decisions without
having access to the necessary information, they also realized that
protection was needed for certain types of communications. Accord-
ing to a former Attorney General, in order to be fair to governmental
employees, information accumulated in personnel files ought to be
protected from disclosure." Individuals within the government must
be able to communicate fully and frankly without publicity and
government officials cannot operate effectively when they are re-
quired to disclose information prematurely.
Motivated by such concerns, Congress provided nine exceptions
to the Freedom of Information Act.5' At the same time the drafters
11 In Ethyl Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973),
the court stated that the common law aspect of the executive privilege was codified in the
Freedom of Information Act and as a result a bare assertion of the executive privilege does
not limit the court's authority to participate in determining the scope of the privilege through
the use of in camera inspection. Id. at 50.
11 For a discussion of the need to control the attorney-client privilege within the corpora-
tion, see Note, 84 HAav. L. REv. 424 (1970), supra note 4, at 424-35.
19 The policy of the Act requires that the disclosure requirement be construed broadly, the
exemptions narrowly. Sotfcie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"1 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961)).
Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (United States Dept. of Justice, Ramsey Clark, Attorney General, June
1967) 1, reprinted in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION SOURCE BOOK, at 200 (1974).
, The Act does not apply to matters that are-
(1) specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a per-
son and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation, with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory file compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent
available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports pre-
pared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation
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of the Act realized the necessity for these exemptions, however, they
recognized that it was important to place controls on the resulting
privileges. Accordingly, when an assertion of a privilege arising
under the Act is challenged, the court must decide whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of the privilege; it is
able to make this determination through in camera inspection with-
out disclosing allegedly confidential information.2
The scope of the executive privilege was closely examined in
Nixon v. Sirica,53 where President Richard M. Nixon claimed that
the privilege was absolute, at least with respect to conversations he
had with his advisors. When the Special Prosecutor challenged this
assertion of the executive privilege, the court was forced to consider
whether the executive privilege was subject to judicial determina-
tion.
The court, in reaching the conclusion that the privilege was not
absolute, noted the importance of the privilege in governmental
decisionmaking and reviewed three important factors. Courts gener-
ally recognize that there is a public interest in maintaining the
secrecy of military and diplomatic plans which overrides private
litigation interests.54 Moreover, the courts generally recognize exec-
utive pleas to protect intragovernmental documents reflecting de-
liberations which are a part of the governmental decisionmaking
process and as a result extend the executive privilege beyond that
specified under the first exemption in the Freedom of Information
Act."' The rationale for the extension is that the candor of executive
advisors will be diminished if they are persistently concerned about
whether their advice and deliberations will later. be made public.56
or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concern-
ing wells.
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
52 The court itself must determine if the circumstances of the case are appropriate for the
claim of the executive privilege but in doing so cannot force disclosure of the very thing that
is to be protected. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1953); Epstein v. Resor, 296
F. Supp. 214, 218 (N.D. Cal. 1969), affl'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965
(1970). The court is not required to inspect the report as long as the government can satisfy
the court that its claim of privilege is justifiable. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875);
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
55 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carl Zeiss Shifung v. V.E.B. Carl
Zeiss Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 952 (1967).
"' See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 947 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
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The third factor cited by the court is one that suggests a solution to
the private sector executive's dilemma: whenever the executive
privilege has been challenged the court has determined its applica-
bility.57 While there is a presumption that conversations between
the President and his advisors are privileged, whenever the privilege
has been challenged the court has generally ordered in camera
inspection of the allegedly privileged materials.- This procedure has
protected privileged information from public disclosure and allowed
the courts to order the disclosure of non-privileged information.
Nixon v. Sirica is relevant to the formulation of a new executive
privilege because it holds that the executive privilege is not abso-
lute; it can be subject to judicial determination. 9 This safeguard is
essential because without this method of judicial control, the execu-
tive privilege would be subject to the caprice of the executive and
could be used to protect an executive from criminal prosecution;
such protection is clearly beyond the intended scope of the privi-
lege."
The.Nixon opinion is also relevant because it indicates that appli-
cation of the executive privilege in each case depends upon a weigh-
ing of the public interest protected by the privilege against the
public interest that would be prejudiced by disclosure.' The court
11 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. Reynolds,
435 U.S. 1 (1953); Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1964); United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1960); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958)).
" E.g., Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963);
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Olson Rug Co. v.
NLRB, 291 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1961); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
" 487 F.2d 700, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972).
" A comparison of both the attorney-client privilege and the executive privilege recognized
by the courts under the Freedom of Information Act indicates that both privileges are based
on a balancing test. For example, in determining the application of the attorney-client privi-
lege, the Fifth Circuit has stated that "an exception is justified if-and only if-policy
requires it to be recognized when measured against the fundamental responsibility of every
person to give testimony." Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2192, 2285, at 70, 525 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961)). The Ninth
Circuit, upholding the claim of the attorney-client privilege where the attorney-defendant
refused to divulge the names of clients who had employed him to voluntarily mail sums of
money to the government in payment for income taxes when no government audit or investi-
gation was pending, stated that "[w]hile it is the great purpose of law to ascertain the truth,
there is the countervailing necessity of insuring the right of every person to freely and fully
confer and confide in one having knowledge in the law, and skilled in its practice in order
that the former may have adequate advice and proper defense." Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d
623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960). Similarly, the Nixon court, in construing United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 30 (1800) (No. 14,692), stated that the application of the executive privilege
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held that the Special Prosecutor had made a strong showing that
the subpoenaed tapes contained information that was vital to the
prosecutor's case and could not be obtained elsewhere. The Presi-
dent was thus ordered to present the taped conversation in question
to the court for in camera inspection.
The Executive Privilege in the Private Sector
Because the free flow of ideas and the protection necessary to
communicate those ideas is just as important in the private sector,
a protection similar to the executive privilege under the Freedom of
Information Act should be created to protect communications made
by corporate executives which would normally fall within the
corporation's attorney-client privilege. The protection of the execu-
tive under such a privilege would be derived from the executive's
position in the corporation and not from his relationship with the
corporation's attorney.62 First, this would allow the attorney to avoid
the conflict of interest and malpractice problems that would be
created by an extension of the conventional privilege. Second, com-
munications made by the corporate executive to corporate counsel
would not be disclosed by the corporation without the executive's
consent or a court order issued after in camera inspection to deter-
mine if the circumstances are appropriate for recognizing the privi-
lege. The court, of course, need not hear the whole communication;
it simply must be satisfied that the executive's claim is justified.
Under such an executive privilege, the nature of the privileged
communication would not differ from those considered privileged
under the conventional attorney-client privilege. The executive
privilege would simply allow the corporate spokesperson to claim
the privilege for himself when the communication in question falls
within the category of communications for which a corporate client
could assert the attorney-client privilege. Communications made
pursuant to fraudulent and criminal acts would be excepted under
the executive privilege in the same manner as they are excepted
under the conventional attorney-client privilege.6 3 Moreover, com-
depends upon a weighing of the public interest protected by the privilege against the public
interests that would be served by disclosure in a particular case. 487 F.2d 700, 716 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
82 The joint-clients exception to the privilege would thus not affect an executive's right to
claim the new privilege because the joint-clients exception is based upon the attorney-client
relationship while the proposed executive privilege is not.
" "Communications made by a client to his attorney during or before the commission of a
crime or fraud for the purpose-of being guided or assisted in its commission are not privi-
leged." Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970).
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bining the fraud and crime exception to the attorney-client privilege
with in camera inspection would provide the courts with the tools
necessary to prevent abuses of the proposed privilege.
Neither the quality nor the quantity of evidence necessary for
effective judicial factfinding would be reduced by this limited exec-
utive privilege. Under the current law, corporate counsel only sup-
plies the type of evidence in question if the interests of the corpora-
tion and its executives should be severed. The elimination of this
entirely fortuitous evidence is unlikely to have much impact on the
judicial system.
CONCLUSION
The creation of an executive privilege in the private sector analo-
gous to the governmental executive privilege in the Freedom of In-
formation Act would protect the interests of the executive and in-
sure the free flow of information necessary for the corporation to
plan its daily actions. Like the conventional privilege, the executive
privilege would be a narrow exception to the general duty to disclose
evidence.
For the corporate executive, the executive privilege would mean
that he no longer may be required to disclose information to the
corporation's attorney without any protection against disclosure of
the communication. For the corporation, it would facilitate the flow
of information between the executive and the corporation's attor-
ney. As the court noted in Nixon, governmental advisors, and by
analogy corporate executives, are more willing to express their ideas
and voice their doubts when they are secure that such communica-
tions may not easily be disclosed. The proposed executive privilege
will thus bolster the corporation's attorney-client privilege because
it will encourage the type of client communication the attorney-
client privilege was designed to foster.
Moreover by encouraging executive communications in the corpo-
ration the executive privilege will supplement the corporation's
right to legal counsel in the same way that the attorney-client privi-
lege supplements the right to counsel in the noncorporate setting;
it will provide the corporation's attorney with the information nec-
essary to help his client."
E. ELIZABETH PERLMAN
" "The privilege is in vain if it does not secure freedom of professional consultation. Unless
the confidence be inviolate, there will of necessity be restraints upon communication working
grievous injury and injustice. The solemn obligation of secrecy is inherent in the essential
right to counsel." State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 415, 129 A.2d 417, 425 (1957).
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